requirement. Some courts have held that states may not waive the requirement. 9 Others have allowed explicit waivers and concessions, 1 0 and one court declared section 2254 inapplicable when the state failed to brief the issue. 1 1 Several court of appeals panels have barred states from raising the exhaustion issue when it was not first contested in the district court; 12 others have overlooked this failure 1 and some have even raised the issue on their own initiative. 14 The Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue. That a statutory requirement, absolute in its terms, can be subject to waiver and forfeiture is established easily enough. Many procedural and substantive requirements, even constitutional barriers, disappear at the request or neglect of the interested party without the aid of any operative language in the requirement itself.
1 5 The more difficult question, and the subject of this comment, is whether the exhaustion requirement should be subject to waiver and forfeiture and, if so, under what circumstances. The legislative history of section 2254 gives no indication that Congress considered this question; the articulated legislative objectives only suggest what Congress might have intended had it thought about the issue. Answers consistent with the policies behind the exhaustion requirement can be formulated, but the answers, like the policies, conflict with one another. The treatment of other comparable requirements suggests ways of resolving these ambiguities. After examining the codification of the exhaustion requirement and the policies Congress intended it to serve, this comment compares how waiver and forfeiture problems have been resolved by the courts for requirements serving similar policies. The comment concludes that waiver or concession of the exhaustion requirement should be allowed, that failure to raise the issue in the district court should foreclose consideration of it on appeal, and that an erroneous concession that the requirement has been satisfied should be binding at the appellate level.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION OF THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
When Congress included an exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petititons in the Judicial Code of 194816 (the dismiss for failure to exhaust "'close to frivolous'" (quoting district court)). The Supreme Court appeared to sanction a limited form of forfeiture of an exhaustion defense in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576-77 (1974) (Court notes that appellant's exhaustion argument "is belatedly raised," not having been presented in the district court, but finds that the requirement had been satisfied) (dictum).
13 See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 507 F.2d 1309, 1312 (2d Cir. 1974) (failure to raise exhaustion issue in the district court does not bar consideration of it on appeal), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975).
14 See United States ex rel. Lockett v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Bd., 600 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir. 1979) ("there is no bar to our raising the issue of exhaustion on our own, although it has not been raised by the State").
5 See generally infra notes 104-54 and accompanying text. 16 Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified as amended at 28 "Code") it was merely following established judicial practice. 17 Questions of waiver and forfeiture arose only after the rule was codified and thus were not addressed in pre-Code case law. Congress left little sign in the statute, its legislative history, or subsequent amendments of having considered these questions.
A. Ex parte Hawk and the Pre-Code Development of the Exhaustion Requirement
Pre-Code case law arguably is not relevant to the problem of waiver and forfeiture, because before the Code there was no statutory exhaustion requirement to waive or forfeit. 1 8 Section 2254 was designed, however, to enact pre-Code judicial doctrine. The Reviser's note for the Judicial Code states that section 2254 "is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court" 9 in Ex parte Hawk. 20 Any rule of waiver and forfeiture should at least be consistent with the doctrine Congress intended to incorporate in the statute.
In a brief per curiam opinion," 1 the Court did little m6re in Ex
U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976)).
17 See infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text. 18 The 1867 habeas corpus statute said nothing about exhaustion but simply commanded that writs be granted to those "restrained of [their] liberty in violation of the constitution." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976)). It therefore required an exercise of judicial discretion for a federal court to dismiss a habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. The question of whether a state's attorney could block this exercise of discretion by waiving or conceding the exhaustion requirement was never addressed. Now that the requirement has been enacted into law, however, it takes an exercise of judicial discretion not to dismiss a habeas corpus petition if state remedies are not exhausted, unless the specific exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) parte Hawk than recite the basic rule of exhaustion 22 and list the major cases in its development. 23 The brevity of the opinion and its reliance on earlier decisions suggest that the Court intended merely to summarize and perpetuate the doctrine of the earlier cases, perhaps with an eye to the codification process then underway. 24 The Court had frequently noted since its earliest decisions that the judicial exhaustion requirement was discretionary in nature, designed to regulate the federal power to issue the writ of habeas corpus when state courts had not yet completed their proceedings. 25 In its first exhaustion decision, Ex parte Royall, 2e the Court stressed the discretionary nature of the requirement. "That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations .. . between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound" to uphold the Constitution. 2 8 In Tinsley v. Anderson, 9 the Court drew a clear distinction between a federal court's "power" to grant a writ of habeas corpus and the policy that it "ought not to exercise that jurisdiction" unless state remeassistance of counsel and the alleged use of perjured evidence at his trial. See 321 U.S. at 115-16. These claims had been presented as an original matter to the Nebraska Supreme Court in an application for habeas corpus, but the application was denied because that court does not ordinarily hear original petitions for habeas corpus. See id. at 116. 21 Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted. 321 U.S. at 116-17 (citations omitted). Where state remedies have not been exhausted "the federal courts . . . will interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts only 'in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist." ' Id. at A Summary, 1966 -1971 , 7 GONz. L. REv. 34, 36 (1971 Nothing in Hawk indicates that the court intended to alter the traditionally discretionary nature of the exhaustion rule. Although the pre-Code cases cannot resolve the issue, it would not be fully consistent with the discretionary rule they created and section 2254 adopted to construe the statute so as to foreclose all discretion to allow waiver and forfeiture.
B. Legislative History of Section 2254
Congress enacted section 2254 as part of its revision of the Judicial Code in 1948.33 Considering the sheer volume of law created by the enactment of the Code, 3 ' its legislative history is rather meager.
3 5 With about one page devoted to it in the Senate Report" and passing mention on the Senate floor, 37 section 2254 was given, if anything, disproportionate attention for such a small part of this major piece of legislation. 8 Even before Congress's Code revision began, 3 9 the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (the "Conference") had initiated action aimed at reforming federal habeas corpus legislation. 40 The Conference adopted two legislative proposals in 1943, one dealing with habeas corpus procedure, "the other limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue the writ. ' 41 The so-called "jurisdictional bill ' 42 included a section codifying the exhaustion requirement. 43 In 1947 the House passed a version of the Code that incorporated much of what the Conference desired, though not characterizing the exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional." The Conference endorsed the House version and recommended two amendments to the habeas corpus sections in the Code, 45 both of which Congress adopted. 46 Had Congress followed the Judicial Conference and used the term "jurisdictional" to characterize the exhaustion requirement, the question of waiver and forfeiture might never have arisen. A requirement that goes to a court's subject matter jurisdiction must (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless (1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
tion requirement is not colored by language purporting to affect the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 6 2 Congress amended section 2254 in 1966,3 moving its then existing language into subsections (b) and (c) 64 and adding subsections (a) and (d) through (f).
6 5 New subsection (a) provides, 6 6 in effect, that the grounds stated in section 2241(c)(3)67 provide the only predicate for federal jurisdiction over the habeas corpus claims of state prisoners: the federal court "shall entertain an application for the writ" if the petitioner claims he is held in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." By reiterating that an alleged violation of federal law provides jurisdiction, the amendment is further evidence that the exhaustion requirement limits the availability of a remedy, not the court's jurisdiction. 9 Section 2254(b) provides simply that "[a]n application shall not be granted" unless state remedies are exhausted. 0
II. POLICmS UNDERLYING THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
The language, structure, legislative history, and pre-Code background of the exhaustion requirement lend virtually no support to the proposition that the requirement was intended to be a 73 the Court examined the policies and purposes behind the requirement to determine the proper construction of the statute. This part looks at those policies and purposes to see what answers they indicate for the problem of waiver and forfeiture.
A. Comity and Federalism
The very existence of federal habeas corpus review of state court convictions threatens to disrupt the delicate balances required by a federal system of interlocking layers of government. 74 Since 1886, federal courts have voluntarily limited their consideration of habeas corpus petitions to prevent "unnecessary conflict" between federal and state courts.
7 5 The theory is that, with a few limited exceptions, 7 6 federal-state conflict can be minimized and the purposes of federal habeas corpus protection can be served if federal relief is available only after the state has had a full opportunity to settle the prisoner's claim in its own courts. 77 419-20 (1963); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 , 1347 (9th Cir. 1981 Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278 , 1280 (8th Cir. 1978 . The doctrine of comity "teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. at 204. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (comity reflects the "belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways"). Imposing forfeiture for failure earlier in the litigation to raise the exhaustion requirement would provoke federal-state conflict. A state objecting belatedly to the federal proceeding is objecting nonetheless. If comity were the only policy to consider, habeas petitions should be held subject to dismissal for nonexhaustion at any time.
B. Efficient Use of Judicial Resources
Section 2254 was enacted against a background of Supreme Court expansion of the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state court judgments that had resulted in a significant increase in the federal habeas caseload." 4 That increase was at least partly responsible for the Judicial Conference's proposal to codify the exhaustion requirement. 8 Allowing states to waive or concede the exhaustion requirement could affect the federal habeas caseload in a variety of ways depending on the motivation and behavior of state prosecutors. If waivers were used to hasten federal consideration of claims the prosecutor expects will eventually reach federal court, the federal caseload would increase if prosecutors underestimated the likelihood of habeas petitions being finally resolved in state court. Perhaps more important, federal courts would not have the benefit of state court review in such cases. 90 If, on the other hand, waivers or concessions were used to advise the federal court that claims were indeed exhausted or that there would be no point in further state proceedings, 9 1 the court could be spared more detailed examination of these questions. The state's attorney is already required to advise the court "whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies" in the answer to the petition. 9 2 Allowing the state to waive the requirement would merely relieve the court of the burden of scrutinizing this advice.
A prosecutor might also waive the exhaustion requirement believing the claim to be frivolous and preferring summary federal dismissal on the merits to a round of state proceedings. If the federal court agrees that the claim is frivolous, the court can as easily dismiss the petition on the merits as for failure to exhaust state remedies. 9 3 If the federal court disagrees with the prosecutor's assessment of the claim, the waiver would affect demands on the federal court's time. Given an opportunity, the state courts might eliminate the need for any federal review by ruling for the peti- tioner or convincing him that his claim is not worth pursuing. If the state's attorney believed the case could be resolved in state court, however, there would be little incentive for him to avoid such resolution through waiver. It is therefore likely that any claim the prosecutor, but not the federal court, would characterize as frivolous eventually would work its way into federal court. Even so, the federal courts might dispose of these cases more easily with the help of a prior state court review of the claim. 4 To the extent this is so, allowing waiver of frivolous claims would increase the burden on the federal courts and thus perhaps should not be allowed in habeas cases.
Although it is unclear how waiver or concession of the exhaustion requirement would affect the federal courts' caseload, the impact on federal judicial resources of a state not raising the exhaustion requirement at the proper time provides perhaps the most compelling reason to impose a forfeiture rule. The state's attorney is directed by court rules to address exhaustion of state remedies in the state's initial answer to the habeas petition. 9 If the issue is not raised until later in the proceedings, time spent considering the petition in the interim will have been wasted if the court cannot declare the issue forfeited but instead must dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust. Forfeiture not only would provide an incentive for the state's attorney to make sure that any exhaustion claims were presented in good time, but also would ensure that federal judicial resources would not be wasted when the state failed to do SO. Sykes, Court defers to contrary interpretation of state law by federal court of appeals). The applicability of the exhaustion requirement also will frequently turn on an interpretation of state law. sonal liberty. 97 The nature of the writ demands that it be "administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 98 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for "speed, flexibility, and simplicity" in its decisions regarding the exhaustion doctrine. 9 9 The Court has insisted that habeas corpus not be made "a static, narrow, formalistic remedy"' 1 0 0 and that procedural niceties not be allowed to interfere with the underlying policy of providing a federal forum for those imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 0 1
Allowing waiver and forfeiture of the exhaustion requirement could only serve to speed claims on their way into federal court. This observation is of limited value, however, since if "obtaining speedy federal relief" 0 2 were the sole consideration there would be no exhaustion requirement at all. By requiring that a petitioner first pursue available state remedies, the exhaustion requirement necessarily slows the progress of habeas petitions to the federal courts. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while the requirement bars many petitioners from the federal courts, the bar is only temporary and not in absolute derogation of "the right of a state prisoner to apply for relief by habeas corpus to the lower federal courts."' 0 3
D. Summary
The policies underlying the exhaustion requirement do not provide conclusive answers to the problems of waiver and forfeiture. To promote federal-state comity, waiver and concession should probably be allowed, but forfeiture definitely should not be. Conservation of judicial resources, however, would best be served by imposing forfeiture; it is not clear what the effect of allowing waiver would be on the federal habeas docket. Waiver, forfeiture, and concession would all accelerate the progress of claims into federal court-but so would elimination of the exhaustion requirement altogether. To help sort out the priorities and balance these conflicts, the next part looks at how waiver and forfeiture rules have been structured for requirements that serve policies similar to those that underlie the exhaustion requirement.
III. WAIVER AND FORFEITURE RULES FOR OTHER REQUIREMENTS

A. The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment to the Constitution prohibits federal courts from hearing private suits against state governments. 10 4 The language of the amendment does not equivocate or suggest any exceptions to the prohibition but declares plainly that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend" to such suits against a state.
10 5 Nevertheless, states have been allowed to waive the amendment's protection. 1 0
By preventing federal adjudication of the states' liabilities, the eleventh amendment serves to eliminate an area of potentially great federal-state friction. Allowing a state to waive the amendment's protection is consistent with this purpose since there can be no federal-state friction when a state voluntarily consents to be sued in federal court. The amendment has not been construed to be an imposition of an unwanted immunity upon the state but rather is seen as a protection of a state's sovereign right to determine whether, when, and where it will be subject to suit.
10
Although the eleventh amendment may be waived, the Court has consistently required a clear declaration of a state's consent to suit; constructive consent is not looked on with favor. 1 0 8 The Court 107 E.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging to a State... is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.").
108 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) ("Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here."); Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 468 (waiver not to be presumed in the has also stopped short of imposing forfeiture for not raising the eleventh amendment in time, finding that it "sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court."' 1 0 9
The exhaustion requirement was designed to serve federalism interests almost identical to those behind the eleventh amendment. 110 The arguments for allowing waiver of the eleventh amendment also apply to the exhaustion requirement. 1 ' The characteristics of the eleventh amendment that have convinced the Court to make waiver virtually a matter of state policy and to make forfeiture impossible, however, are not found in the exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion requirement was not set up as a jurisdictional bar," 2 nor does it approach constitutional significance. It is not an absolute, permanent bar to the federal courts but partial and temporary, designed to expire on its own terms," 3 with exceptions written into the statute." 4 Waiver and forfeiture, therefore, do not pose as great a threat when applied to the exhaustion requirement as when applied to the eleventh amendment because the interests protected are not as great.
B. The Abstention Doctrine of Younger v. Harris
The judicially created abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris"" was also designed to prevent conflict between absence of clear language to the contrary); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944) S. 37 (1971) . Younger abstention is related to but distinguishable from what is referred to as Pullman abstention, based upon Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) . See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977) . Pullman allows a federal court to abstain when there is a "possibility that the state courts may interpret a challenged state statute so as to eliminate, or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question presented" in the federal action. Id. Because of this, the Court said in Hodory that Pullman abstention could not be waived, id. at 480 n.11, even though Younger abstention was held to be waivable, see infra note 119 and accompanying text. See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (dictum) (Pullman abstention may be enforced even though state has not requested it). Pullman abstention, though not waivable, nevertheless is not absolute. A federal court is not required to abstain when "the possible benefits of abstention become too speculative to justify or require avoidance of the
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[50:354 the states and the federal government. 1 1 6 The doctrine requires federal courts to refrain from enjoining state court proceedings so as not to "unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.1 1 1 7 The requirement is not absolute, however. In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 11 the Court held that the interests protected by the abstention doctrine are not threatened when a state does not contest the propriety of a federal court hearing a case pending in the state's courts: "If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into the State's own system."" 9
For reasons similar to those found for the eleventh amendment 120 and the exhaustion requirment,' 2 ' waiver is consistent with the purposes of Younger abstention. There can be no undue interference with legitimate state activity 22 and thus no cause for federal-state friction when a state "voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum.' ' 23
C. Requirements Designed to Protect A Party
Requirements established solely for the benefit of one of two adversary parties can commonly be waived by that party. Venue, which ensures a party's right to defend in a convenient forum, has been held to be a "personal privilege" for the party to invoke at his question presented." Hodory, 431 U.S. at 481.
116 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 755-56 (1975) 123 Hodory, 431 U.S. at 480. Thus the concerns of Pullman abstention differ both from Younger and from exhaustion. Pullman is designed to prevent federal interference in state affairs and to allow federal courts to avoid the burden of deciding unresolved questions of state law and thereby avoid constitutional questions that might be difficult to resolve. See Hodory, 431 U.S. at 477. Because federal as well as state interests are at stake, the federal court is not obliged to follow the parties' wishes that Pullman abstention be waived. See id. at 280 n.11. Because Younger abstention more simply is "designed to allow the State an opportunity to 'set its own house in order,"' id. at 479-80, the state may waive that opportunity. Similarly, because exhaustion was created initially in response to concerns of comity, and its principal purpose is still to prevent federal-state friction, see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text; but see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing problems of federal caseload), the state interest in waiver is predominant and Younger thus provides a more appropriate analogy.
choice. 124 Waiver of venue requirements is now provided by statute 125 as are waivers of personal jurisdiction 1 2 6 and of process and service requirements. 27 Indeed, objections based on these requirements must be made in a timely fashion or they are forfeited.
28
Affirmative defenses, such as res judicata and estoppel, are also forfeited if not asserted at the trial court level. 129 Governmental parties are capable of waiving and forfeiting these requirements. 1 3 0
Exhaustion of state remedies-a kind of inverted res judicata claim-has been characterized as an affirmative defense by one federal court." 3 1 It is certainly "a matter constituting an avoidance" 1 3 2 of the issues presented by the petitioner. Although the exhaustion requirement was not established solely for the benefit of the state, the state's interests are largely congruent with those the requirement was designed to protect. 3 3 Surely no interest of the petitioner would be jeopardized by allowing waiver or imposing forfeiture. It may be, however, that the interests of the federal 12 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . waived" if not timely filed).
117 Id. 123 Rule 12(h)(1), id., uses the term "waived" rather than "forfeited" even though loss of the defense is "without regard to the defendant's state of mind." Westen, supra note 8, at 1214. For a discussion of the distinction between waiver and forfeiture, see supra note 8. A defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be neither waived nor forfeited. FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(h)(3) (court to dismiss action "[w]henever it appears .. .that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter" 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [50:354 courts and of the federal system are sufficiently distinct to prevent a state from treating the exhaustion requirement as a private prerogative. 34
D. The Tax Injunction Statute
The statutory prohibition of federal court interference with state taxation systems' 3 5 has its roots in federal equity practice. 3 6 Although the statute is not phrased in jurisdictional terms, the Supreme Court has characterized it as a "broad jurisdictional barrier' 37 that has the effect of "cutting back federal equity jurisdiction."" 3 8 The Court has not yet had occasion to take this characterization so far as to rule that the statute cannot be waived.
The tax injunction statute protects interests of federalism by preventing unnecessary federal interference with state fiscal administration. 3 9 The statute promotes the efficient collection of state revenues and guards against disruption of state budgets. 4 0 As with the eleventh amendment' 4 ' and the abstention doctrine, 2 federalism interests would not appear to be threatened once a state waives the protection of the statute. As with the requirements designed to protect one of two adversary parties, 43 it should not be necessary to insist on enforcing the statute's protection if the state does not desire it. Nevertheless, all the circuit courts that have considered the question of waiver under the tax injunction statute have found the Supreme Court's jurisdictional language determinative and therefore have forbidden waiver.
144
The tax injunction statute is distinguishable from the exhaustion requirement in at least one important respect: there is no clearly articulated policy to provide "speedy federal relief"' 1 45 to individuals seeking to escape the effects of allegedly unconstitutional state taxes. Federal law does not give state tax cases any special status or diminish the authority of state court determinations on review in the federal courts, as is the case for habeas corpus petitions. 14 To the contrary, the tax injunction statute singles out state tax cases for special deference to state interests. The Court attributes the origins of the statute not only to federalism, but to equity practice and to a "recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations."' 48 considered Title VII's timely filing requirement, 4 9 which the Court had characterized as "jurisdictional" in earlier cases. 50 The Court pointed out that in those cases "the legal character of the requirement was not at issue."" The legal character of the requirement was at issue in Zipes, and the Court found its somewhat casual earlier use of the term jurisdictional to be of minimal significance. The Court reached its holding by looking to the structure of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of its earlier cases construing the statute. 1 5 2 All three supported the conclusion that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
' " 5 3
The exhaustion requirement is far more complex than Title VII's timely filing requirement; the structure of the legislation, underlying policy and earlier case law do not all point to a single answer to the question of waiver and forfeiture.
1 5 4 Although the formula the Court used in Zipes cannot provide an answer for the exhaustion requirement, it does indicate that the Court is not bound by conclusory labels but is willing to undertake a more functional analysis of the purposes and policies behind the requirement in question.
IV. A PROPOSED RULE OF WAIVER AND FORFEITURE FOR SECTION 2254
A. Waiver and Concession
The strongest argument in favor of allowing states to waive or concede the exhaustion requirement is that it would further the interest in federal-state comity that the requirement was designed to promote. 55 It would, that is, so long as state's attorneys are fully mindful of all the various state interests at stake in their use of waiver. 5 6 Mistrust of state's attorneys might also lead one to speculate that waiver would increase the federal caseload.
1 57 Such objections could be made to waiver of any requirement where important state interests are at stake. Nevertheless, state's attorneys have been given authority to waive such important protections as the Younger absention doctrine' 58 and the substantive defenses of res judicata and estoppel, 1 5 9 as well as less weighty procedural requirements. centive, necessary for the efficient operation of an appellate system, for parties to raise in the trial court all issues that may dispose of their case. Still, some requirements, such as the eleventh amendment, are of such importance that forfeiture will not be imposed for failure to raise them in a timely fashion.1 6 9
While the exhaustion requirement serves important federalism interests similar to those informing the eleventh amendment, 17 0 it can hardly be said to rise to the level of a constitutional barrier. For purposes of forfeiture, the exhaustion requirement is more on a par with such affirmative defenses as res judicata and estoppel.' 7 1 A flexible, 7 2 judicially crafted doctrine, 7 3 it has always been concerned with the efficient operation of the federal courts as well as with federal-state comity.
7 4 Giving the state the opportunity and obligation to make the court aware of the petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies at the commencement of federal habeas proceedings ensures that the state's interests, and those of the federal system, will not be overlooked; holding the state to the position it takes regarding exhaustion in the trial court would help ensure that federal judicial resources will not be needlessly expended.
CONCLUSION
The problem of whether the exhaustion requirement can be waived or forfeited did not arise prior to its codification in 1948. Congress left no sign in the legislative history of having anticipated the problem and provided no guidance for its resolution. The exhaustion requirement was created to promote federal-state comity while responding to the need to safeguard individual liberty. It was codified for those reasons and to limit the use of federal judicial resources. Although these policies can operate at cross-purposes, this comment has argued that it is most consistent with them and 129-30 (1954) (Court need not consider issues not raised in petition for certiorari); Fan. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 12(h)(1) (certain defenses waived if not timely raised). See also supra note 96 (discussing timing of Sykes claims).
161 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. [50:354 with the treatment of comparable requirements to allow states to waive or concede the exhaustion requirement and to require the forfeiture of any exhaustion defense not raised in the trial court.
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